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Abstract
I will propose the notion that the universe is digital, not as a claim
about what the universe is made of but rather about the way it unfolds.
Central to the argument will be the concepts of symmetry breaking
and algorithmic probability, which will be used as tools to compare
the way patterns are distributed in our world to the way patterns are
distributed in a simulated digital one. These concepts will provide a
framework for a discussion of the informational nature of reality. I will
argue that if the universe were analog, then the world would likely be
random, making it largely incomprehensible. The digital model has,
however, an inherent beauty in its imposition of an upper limit and
in the convergence in computational power to a maximal level of so-
phistication. Even if deterministic, that it is digital doesn’t mean that
the world is trivial or predictable, but rather that it is built up from
operations that at the lowest scale are very simple but that at a higher
scale look complex and even random, though only in appearance.
1 Everything out of nothing
Among the simplest hypotheses compatible with the best account of the ori-
gin of the universe that we currently have, one can either choose to start from
nothing, the state of the universe with all its matter and energy squeezed
into an infinitely small point of no length, no width, and infinite density
called a singularity; or else a fraction later, out of a state of complete disor-
der such that once particles formed they couldn’t do anything except collide
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with each other in a completely disordered way. In either case there had to
have been a transition to the state in which we find ourselves today, in a
universe with physical laws describing our reality, from the biggest to the
tiniest, laws that are often simple enough to be easily comprehensible even
if the phenomena they describe are complicated. The universe seems highly
ordered and structured today, in contrast to the background noise left be-
hind by the Big Bang, which is similar to what one would see on the screen
of an old untuned analog TV (Fig. 1, left image) or hear on an untuned
radio station. Given the random state physicists believe to have existed at
the inception, embodying little to no information, how did we arrive at the
structured world that we now inhabit?
Figure 1: From noise to highly organized structures. The cosmic background radiation
(left) or what the universe looked like at all scales in every direction, and the kinds of
structures (right) we find in our everyday life today.
Whether the universe began its existence as a single point, or whether
its inception was a state of complete randomness, one can think of either the
point or the state of randomness as quintessential states of perfect symmetry.
Either no part had more or less information because there were no parts or
all parts carried no information, like white noise on the screen of an untuned
TV. In such a state one would be unable to send a signal, simply because it
would be destroyed immediately. But thermal equilibrium in an expanding
space was unstable, so asymmetries started to arise and some regions now
appeared cooler than others. The universe quickly expanded and began to
produce the first structures.
When the universe had cooled to the point where the simplest atoms
could form, white noise no longer dominated and matter took over, em-
barking on a process of structure formation. The first symmetry breaking
led to more symmetry breaking. This symmetry breaking can be found
everywhere in the universe, from the great disparity between matter and
antimatter (atoms with inverted charge particles) to the way planets ro-
tate in a single direction around the sun; or in the form of what is today
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known as homochirality, groups of molecules that lack a configuration of non-
superposable mirror images; and in living beings, all of whom share amino
acids and sugars but genetically encoded so that each possesses one partic-
ular (arbitrary) molecular orientation rather than another. This symmetry
breaking is the fabric of information. The laws of physics may have arisen in
this way, not as agents shaping the universe but as a result of the unfolding
of this dynamic of information processing from symmetry breaking.
1.1 Complexity from randomness
If you wished to produce the digits of the mathematical constant pi by throw-
ing digits at random, you’d have to try again and again until you got a few
consecutive numbers matching an initial segment of the decimal expansion
of pi. The probability of succeeding would be very small: 1/10 multiplied by
the desired number of digits. For example, (1/10)2400 for a segment of length
2400 digits of pi. But if instead of throwing digits into the air, one were to
throw bits of computer programs and execute them on a digital computer,
things turn out to be very different. For example, a program producing the
digits of the mathematical constant pi would have a greater chance of being
produced by a computer program. The following is an example of a program
written in ANSI C language of only 158 characters producing the first 2400
digits of pi:
int a=10000,b,c=8400,d,e,f[8401],g;main(){for(;b-c;)
f[b++]=a/5;for(;d=0,g=c*2;c-=14,printf(‘‘\%.4d’’,e+d/a),
e=d\%a)for(b=c;d+=f[b]*a,f[b]=d\%--g,d/=g--,--b;d*=b);}
This program compresses the first 2400 digits of pi, and there are many
other formulae that can be implemented as short computer programs to
generate any arbitrary number of digits of pi.
Computer programs are like physical laws; they produce order by fil-
tering out a portion of what one feeds them. Start with a random-looking
string and run a randomly chosen program on it, and there’s a good chance
your random-looking string will be turned into a regular, often non-trivial,
and highly organized one. In contrast, if you were to throw particles, the
chances that they’d group in the way they do if there were no physical laws
would be so small that nothing would happen in our universe. Physical laws,
like computer programs, make things happen.
Just as formulae producing the digits of pi are compressed versions of pi,
physical laws distill natural phenomena from a series of observations. These
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laws are valuable because thanks to them one can predict the outcome of
a natural phenomenon without having to wait for it to unfold in real time.
Solve the equations describing planetary motion and instead of having to
wait two years to know the future positions of a planet, one can (almost1)
know them precisely and in a fraction of a second (the time it takes to
compute the equation) two years in advance. Laws are always associated
with calculations, and it is no coincidence that all these calculations turn out
to be computable, whether the computations are carried out by humans or
by computers. For all practical purposes physical laws are just like computer
programs.
2 A bit-string Universe
When Leibniz started doing binary arithmetic, he thought that the world
could have come into existence from nothing (zero) and one because every-
thing could be written in this language (the simplest possible language by
number of symbols involved), the binary language. Out of this extremely
simplified language, out of its beauty, the world came into being before his
eyes. If the world were digital at the lowest scale one would end up seeing
nothing but strings of bits. They would have looked very random in the first
seconds of existence of the universe, and they would suddenly have started
displaying patterns equivalent to clusters of particles–as actually happened.
Strings would have formed the equivalent of galaxies, bit-string galaxies, bit-
string solar systems and bit-string planets, indeed all manner of bit-string
things.
The existence of human-made digital computers in the universe is an
obvious demonstration that the universe is capable of performing digital
computation. The main questions therefore are whether this computation
occurs naturally in the universe, how pervasive it is, and whether it is of
the same kind as that performed by digital computers. In other words, how
different is a bit-string universe to the universe in which we live. The bit-
string version is of course an oversimplification, but the two may not, in the
end, be that different.
For if all matter is made of the same basic particles, what makes one
object different from another other than the fact that it occupies a different
1Although this is a whole subject unto itself, it may be pointed out here that the fact
that our theories are approximate is due to the same symmetry-breaking happening at all
scales, making our predictions diverge in the long term. But it is this same phenomenon—a
phenomenon that one may associate with imperfection as opposed to perfect symmetry–
that has continuously created information in the past and continues to do so still.
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space? What makes a cup a cup and not a human being is quite simply the
way its particles are configured. One could disassemble a cup (or several
cups) and reassemble them as a human being. What makes a cup a cup and
a human being a human being is information. In an informational universe,
the world would be computing itself, enabling things to remain themselves.
Our digital computers would be reprogramming a part of the universe to
make it compute what we want it to compute.
Figure 2: Patterns generated by a 2D 9-neighbor with Wolfram’s rule number 40. Shown
here are state space diagrams every 6 runtime steps starting from a 100 × 100 array of
(pseudo)random bits.
But at a microscopic level, the quantum greatly differs from the macro-
scopic world. In the macroscopic world randomness is apparent, according
to this view (and ultimately according to classical mechanics), but it is
fundamentally different under the standard interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. At the quantum scale, things seem disconnected, yet a compatible
informational interpretation may be possible. Information can only exist in
our world if it is carried by a process; every bit has to have a correspon-
dent physical carrier. Even though this carrier is not matter, it takes the
form of an interaction between components of matter, an atom interacting
with another atom, or a particle interacting with another particle. But at
the lowest level, the most elementary particles, just like single bits, carry
no information (the Shannon Entropy of a single bit is 0) when they are
not interacting with other particles. They have no causal history because
are memoryless isolated from external interaction. When particles interact
with other particles they link themselves to a causal network and look as
if they were forced to define a value as a result of this interaction (e.g. a
measurement). What surprises us about the quantum world is precisely its
lack of the causality that we see everywhere else and are so used to. But it
is the interaction and its causal history that carries all the memory of the
system, with the new bit appearing to us as if it had been defined at ran-
dom. Linking a bit to the causal network may also produce correlations of
measurements between seemingly disconnected parts of space, but if space
is informational at its deepest level, if information is even more fundamental
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than the matter of which it is made and the physical laws governing that
matter, the question of whether these effects violate physical laws may be
irrelevant.
As Charles Bennett[1] has pointed out before, in a discrete universe,
information is never lost. If one throws a deck of cards into the air, they
spread out as they fall, the original order becomes unknowable once on the
floor, but the information indicating the cards exact original position and
path to the floor is hidden in the form of the air molecules that the cards
displaced, the particles that the cards touched in their way to the floor, the
particles touched by the particles touched by the cards, even the heat all this
particles friction produced. Reversing every motion would restore the deck
to its initial condition. If anything in the chain turns out to be random this
basic principle collapses, how much the collapsing would affect the world
depends of how the world is connected at all scales. Whether there is a kind
of garbage collector at the lowest level of the universe to erase this memory
is yet to be discovered but as Bennett points out based in the principles of
thermodynamics, this is not the case, information does not disappears. If the
world were analog the way this information dissipates may allow information
loss. But producing random bits in a discrete universe, where all events are
the cause of other events, would actually be very expensive because one
would need to devise a way to break the causal network, assuming that this
were possible to begin with, produce a random bit, and keep the rest of the
causal network untouched (otherwise we would see nothing but randomness,
which is not the case).
3 The algorithmic nature of the world
If one does not have any reason to choose a specific distribution and no
prior information is available about a dataset, the uniform distribution is
the one making no assumptions according to the principle of indifference.
Consider an unknown operation generating a binary string of length k bits.
If the method is uniformly random, the probability of finding a particular
string s is exactly 2−k, the same as for any other string of length k, which
is equivalent to the chances of picking the right digits of pi. However, data
(just like pi–largely present, for example, in nature in the form of common
processes relating to curves) are usually produced not at random but by a
process.
There is a measure which describes the expected pattern frequency dis-
tribution of an abstract machine running a random program. A process that
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produces a string s with a program p when executed on a universal Turing
machine T has probability m(s)[8] (identified as the miraculous universal
distribution in [7]). For any given string s, there is an infinite number of
programs that can produce s, but m(s) is defined such that one can as-
sign a probability of a string being produced by a random program (see the
Appendix).
The distribution m(s) has another interesting particularity, one can start
out of almost anything and, as most probabilistic distributions, the distri-
bution remains mostly unchanged. It is the process that determines the
shape of the distribution and not the initial conditions from which the pro-
grams may start from. This is important because one does not make any
assumption on the distribution of initial conditions but on the distribution
of programs. Programs running on a universal Turing machine should be
uniform, which does not necessarily mean truly random. For example, to
approach m(s) from below, one can actually define a set of programs of
certain size and define any enumeration to systematically run each program
one by one.
This is important because this means one does not actually need true
randomness, the kind of randomness assumed in quantum mechanics. So
one does not really need quantum mechanics to explain the complexity of
the world or to underly reality to explain it, one does require, however,
computation, at least in this informational worldview. It is information
that we think may explain some quantum phenomena and not quantum
mechanics what explains computation (neither the structures in the world
and how it seems to algorithmically unfold), so we put computation at the
lowest level underlying physical reality.
Just as strings can be produced by programs, we may ask after the
probability of a certain outcome from a certain natural phenomenon, if the
phenomenon, just like a computing machine, is a process rather than a
random event. If no other information about the phenomenon is assumed,
one can see whether m(s) says anything about a distribution of possible
outcomes in the real world. In a world of computable processes, m(s) would
indicate the probability that a natural phenomenon produces a particular
outcome and how often a certain pattern would occur. If you were going
to bet against certain events in the real world, without having any other
information, m(s) would be a reasonable decision if the world were digital,
just as m(s) is for abstract (digital) machines.
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Figure 3: Start out of nothing or out of randomness and one gets a structured world by
iterated computation.
3.1 Unveiling the machinery
So if one wished to know whether the world were algorithmic in nature,
one would first need to specify what an algorithmic world would look like.
If the world is in any respect an algorithmic world, the structures in it
should be alike, with their distribution of patterns resembling each other.
To demonstrate this, we conceived and performed[16] a series of experiments
to produce data by purely algorithmic means in order to compare it to sets
of data produced by several physical sources.
On the one hand, samples from physical sources were taken. At the right
level data can always be written in binary because each physical observation
leading to values (weight, location, etc.) can be numerated independently as
a discrete sequence. Each frequency distribution is the result of the count of
the number of occurrences of k-tuples (substrings of length k) extracted from
the binary strings from both the empirical and the digital datasets obtained
from the output of digital machines. On the other hand, we produced an ex-
perimental version of m(s) by running a large set of small Turing machines
for which the halting times are known (thanks to the Busy Beaver problem).
The frequency distributions generated were then statistically compared (see
[16]). A ranking correlation test was carried out and its significance mea-
sured to validate either the null hypothesis or the alternative (the latter
being that the similarities among empirical data and the digital world are
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due to chance).
Some similarities and differences between the physical world and the
purely algorithmic world were found. To cite a typical example of a differ-
ence, in the study of the string symmetry group (see Appendix), strings of
the type (01)n appear low-ranked in the empirical data distributions, unlike
in the digital ones, where they appear better ranked. In the real world,
just as processes don’t start from a blank tape (to use a Turing machine
as an analogy–see Appendix), strings are usually not delimited, one can-
not really tell when a physical phenomena has stopped but rather when the
measurement finished. In the real world, the probability of destroying highly
symmetrical strings due to this lack of delimitation is higher than that of
assembling a symmetrical string by changing bits at random. There is no
way to tell when a process starts or ends in nature, and likewise there is
no way to set measurements taking into account the “right” time lengths of
empirical dataset streams.
In the simulated world things are different because machines have a
halting configuration, such as a special halting state. And because in our
simulated world machines have no interaction with any other machines, peri-
odic and highly symmetric strings have a greater chance of making it intact,
appearing better ranked in the frequency of strings from higher to lower fre-
quency (hence lower to higher random complexity). To verify that this was
actually the case we set up two other different experiments. One consisted
in starting the machines from random initial conditions. Even if this does
not fully simulate having processes interacting with other processes at every
step, it is a setup closer to what happens in the real world, where compu-
tations usually start where other computations end. The other experiment
consisted of running non-self-delimited machines like one-dimensional cel-
lular automata which by definition do not have any halting configuration.
Their computations could be halted at arbitrary times, resulting in strings
of arbitrary length, just as would happen in most experiments in the real
world when one has basically to decide when to stop making a measurement
in order to start a frequency analysis. What we found was what we were
expecting to find: the highly structured (01)n string was ranked lower com-
pared to the first simulation, and the longer the n the less well ranked in
comparison to the original experiment with halting machines, and closer to
the rank of the distributions of empirical data.
What happens is that in the real world highly organized strings have
little chance of making it if they interact with other systems. Changing a
single bit destroys a perfect 2-period pattern of a (01)n string, and the longer
the string, the greater the odds of it being destroyed by an interaction with
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another system or because it has been trimmed in the wrong place at the
time of the measurement. In the case of halting Turing machines, however,
strings are delimited by the code telling the machine to produce exactly n
alternations and halt.
We found that while the correlation between the real world dataset and
the digital dataset was not significant enough to be conclusive, each dis-
tribution was correlated–with varying degrees of confidence–with at least
one algorithmic distribution produced by a model of computation. In other
words, distributions from empirical data disperse patterns in a similar way
to the distributions generated by using digital computers (Turing machines,
cellular automata and other abstract machines).
3.2 How different is our world from a simulated digital one?
To illustrate how natural processes may be algorithmic, and to specify what
we really mean by this, the case of DNA could serve as a perfect example.
Processes known to be involved in the replication and transmission of DNA
are, among others, chromosomal translocation (a fragment of one chromo-
some is broken off and is then attached to another), reverse transcriptase,
fragment code exchange and crossover, chemical annealing (pairing by hy-
drogen bonds to a complementary sequence) and DNA denaturation (separa-
tion into single-stranded lengths through the breaking of hydrogen bonding
between the bases). These are all relatively simple processes. A subset
of purely digital operations can match such operations with computational
ones. Operations such as joining, copying, partitioning, complementation,
trimming, or replacing are equivalent to those that may be observed in DNA.
Rules determining the way DNA replicates may also be of the same algorith-
mic type as those governing other types of physical phenomena, leading us
to sometimes discover strong similarities in their tuples distribution. DNA
construction, except perhaps for the mutation operation (the result of in-
teraction with another system and not necessarily a true random operation)
is the result of a long period of application of simple rules, with layer upon
layer of the code of life built up over billions of years in a deep algorithmic
process with its own characteristic rules making things like protein unfolding
to appear to us highly complex.
The claim that empirical data can be treated as a whole as a distribution
(i.e. the frequency of certain patterns against others)–as if all empirical data
were of the same nature–must of course be made with great circumspection.
One would first need to show that there is a general joint distribution be-
hind all sorts of empirical data. This was indeed something that we tested
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and reported[16]. The demonstration that most empirical data carries an
algorithmic signal is that most data are comprehensible to some greater or
lesser degree. Think of the diverse kinds of data that you store in your per-
sonal computer, whether music, images or text, all of them highly (lossless)
compressible.
One may wonder whether the lossless compressibility of data is in any
sense an indication of the discreteness of the world. It is, and we have
presented some material here that supports our answer. The relationship
is actually strong; the chances of finding incompressible data in an analog
world are much greater, simply because the possibilities for anything are
much greater. The essential difference between one world and the other is
the introduction of actual infinity. An analog world means that one can
divide space and/or time into an infinite number of pieces, and that matter
and everything else may be capable of following any of these infinitely many
paths and convoluted trajectories. It may seem possible to make a lot of
sense out of it by way of the successful fields of differential calculus and
mathematical analysis, yet one has to make a distinction between what
symbols represent and what the actual calculations among the symbols are.
If our world is analog, it would have a greater chance of looking like a
Chaitin Ω, a random number by definition (see the Appendix), dependent
on the unpredictability of universal digital computers, also called the halting
probability. The world may be a small, apparently ordered fragment of a
globally random universe, as Calude and Meyerstein have suggested[3]. In
which case we should consider ourselves extremely lucky to live in a tiny,
apparently ordered part.
Unlike some physicists who seem to think that a theory explaining the
universe will ultimately be very complicated and mathematical (for example
the views expressed by Stephen Weinberg in a recent interview with Amir
Aczel[11]), we think that the correlations found are due to the following rea-
son: general physical processes are dominated by simple algorithmic rules,
the same rules that digital computers are capable of carrying out. Our ap-
proach suggests that the information in the world is the result of processes
resembling computer programs rather than of dynamics characteristic of a
more random, or analog, world.
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Appendix: Some basic theory
Turing machine
A Turing machine[14] is a 5-tuple {si, ki, s′i, k′i, di}, where si is the tape
symbol the machine’s head is scanning at time t, ki the machine’s current
state (the instruction) at time t, s′i a unique symbol to write (the machine
can overwrite a 1 on a 0, a 0 on a 1, a 1 on a 1, or a 0 on a 0) at time t+1, k′i
a state to transition into (which may be the same as the one it was already
in) at time t+ 1, and di a direction to move in time t+ 1, either to the right
(R) cell or to the left (L) cell, after writing. At a time t the Turing machine
produces an output described by the contiguous cells in the tape visited by
the head. The machine halts if and when it reaches the special halt state 0.
A universal Turing machine is capable of reading the transition rules of
any other machine and performing the same computation over any initial
configuration of the tape.
The halting problem
One can ask whether there is a Turing machine U which, given code(T ) and
the input s, eventually stops and produces 1 if T (s) halts, and 0 if T (s) does
not halt. Turing[14] proves that there is no such U .
The Busy Beaver game
We denote by (n, 2) the class (or space) of all n-state 2-symbol Turing ma-
chines (with the halting state not included among the n states). A busy
beaver machine[10] is a Turing machine that writes more 1s on the tape
than any other of the same size (number of states).
If σT is the number of 1s on the tape of a Turing machine T upon halting,
then:
∑
(n) = max {σT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts}.
If tT is the number of steps that a machine T takes upon halting, then
S(n) = max {tT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts}. ∑(n) and S(n) are noncom-
putable by reduction to the halting problem. Values are known for (n,2)
with n ≤ 4.
Algorithmic complexity
The algorithmic complexity[13, 6, 8, 4] (also known as Kolmogorov-Chaitin
complexity or program-size complexity) CU (s) of a string s with respect to
a universal Turing machine U , measured in bits, is defined as the length in
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bits of the shortest Turing machine U that produces the string s and halts.
Formally, CU (s) = min{|p|, U(p) = s} where |p| is the length of p measured
in bits.
Algorithmic complexity formalizes the concept of simplicity versus com-
plexity. It opposes what is simple to what is complex or random.
Algorithmic probability
Levin’s m(s) is the probability of producing a string s with a random pro-
gram p when running on a universal prefix-free Turing machine[8]. That is,
a machine for which a valid program is never the beginning of any other
program, so that one can define a convergent probability the sum of which
is at most 1. Formally, m(s) = Σp:U(p)=s2
−|p|, i.e. the sum over all the
programs for which U with p outputs the string s and halts. m(s) is the
probability that the output of U is s when provided with a sequence of fair
coin flip inputs as a program. m is related to the concept of algorithmic
complexity in that m(s) is at least the maximum term in the summation of
programs, which is 2−C(s). Roughly speaking, algorithmic probability says
that if there are many long descriptions of a certain string, then there is also
a short description (low algorithmic complexity) and vice versa. As neither
C(s) nor m(s) is computable, no program can exist which takes a string s
as input and produces m(s) as output.
String symmetry group
The symmetry group of an object is the group of all isometries under which it
is invariant. One can identify three symmetry preserving transformations for
bit strings: identity (id), reversion (re), complementation (co) and the com-
position of (re) and (co) are the possible symmetry preserving operations.
A tool that makes it possible to count the number of discrete combinatorial
objects of a given type as a function of their symmetrical cases is provided
by Burnside’s lemma, given by the formula: (2n+2n/2+2n/2)/4 for n odd,
(2n+ 2(n+ 1)/2)/4 otherwise.
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